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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
This work juxtaposes the analysis of 
the federal discourse on the exclave posi-
tion of the Kaliningrad region in 1994—
2012 based on the screening by the 
Nezavisimaya gazeta and the results of 
surveys of students at the Immanuel Kant 
Baltic Federal University and the Uni-
versities of Gdansk and Klaipeda using a 
similar questionnaire.  
Students of  all three universities show 
latent dissatisfaction with employment pros-
pects, which is manifested in the declared in-
tention to emigrate. The orientation of young 
residents of Kaliningrad and their peers from 
Gdansk and Klaipeda towards prevailing 
connections with Europe is complicated by 
the uncertainty of the EU-Russia relations. 
Young residents of Gdansk and Klaipeda re-
produce dated stereotypes, and their interest 
in the Kaliningrad region is limited. How-
ever, as the experience of the other countries 
suggests, local border traffic between the Ka-
liningrad region and the neighbouring Polish 
voivodeships can contribute to the improve-
ment of mutual images. 
Long-lasting efforts to diversify co-
operation and promote a positive image 
of Kaliningrad in the neighbouring Pol-
ish regions can prove worthwhile. Apart 
from the measures aimed at strengthen-
ing the region’s economic base, it is nec-
essary to increase the symbolic capital of 
Kaliningrad to achieve harmonious de-
velopment of Kaliningrad identity. 
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 5 
The Kaliningrad region and its exclave status are the focus of attention of 
many scholars from different countries and disciplinary backgrounds. Neverthe-
less, the prospects of cooperation with the neighbouring Polish voivodeships and 
Lithuanian counties — once an integrated socioeconomic and even political 
space — remain unclear. They are affected not only by physical factors — the de-
velopment of functional network connections underlying the regionalisation pro-
cesses — but also by the dominant political discourse in the neighbouring coun-
tries, as well as the ideas of foreign policy and economic priorities prevalent in the 
society, and the images of partners in the mass consciousness. A question arises as 
to the degree to which public opinion supports the official rhetoric and approves of 
the governmental policy for the region’s adaptation to its exclave position. It is fol-
lowed by questions about what individual strategies are developed by the region’s 
residents in these conditions, and to what degree they affect the attitudes towards 
the neighbours in general and the perception of the region’s position within the 
Baltic region, the country, Europe, and the world. 
Border studies show that any formal demarcation line — between states, 
provinces, and even municipalities — is a complex and constantly evolving so-
cial structure that has to be considered on different scales — from the global and 
macroregional to the local ones (see, for instance 22; 25; 31). In the perception 
of people, the “scale” of the border can change depending on the nature of their 
everyday activities and needs. It can be perceived as a purely local phenomenon, 
“the sacred boundary of motherland,” a demarcation line between “civilisa-
tions”, which reinforces the differences between identities on the other side 
thereof or an axis of transboundary space, or both of it in different proportions 
[28]. In a classical study of the valley of Cerdanya on the border between the 
French and Spanish parts of Catalonia, the American historian P. Shalins 
showed how the political and economic interests of its residents affected their 
attitudes to the neighbouring states [29]. In its turn, the perception of the border 
of a neighbouring region or country is an important factor affecting the intensity 
of transboundary flows and the overall success of cross-border cooperation [21]. 
A border region is a territory, the identity of whose residents can transform rap-
idly under certain conditions and where the state is sometimes forced to take 
special efforts to win the loyalty of its citizens [13; 30]. 
An effective tool in studying these problems is critical geopolitics, which 
combines geographical, sociological, political sciences, and other methods, as well 
as the functional and constructive approaches [11; 27; 24]. The principal task is to 
compare the political discourse with the ideas of citizens and the “objective” indi-
cators of the condition and interaction of different territories. The key concept of 
critical geopolitics is the geopolitical vision of the world interpreted as a set of 
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prevalent ideas of the correlations between different elements of the political 
space, national security and related threats, and advantages and disadvantages of a 
certain foreign policy strategy. The positioning of a country or a part thereof in the 
world in relation to its close and distant neighbours, and self-identification with a 
certain region of the world, country or city are the most important part of identity. 
When answering the question, “Where, in what country, in what region of the world 
do I live?” a person inevitably answers the question, “Who am I, what are my val-
ues and ideals?” Self-identification with a certain region of the world is a question 
of cultural and political values rather than geographical knowledge [26]. Most 
countries belong simultaneously to several territorial and cultural groups. For ex-
ample, Russia can be considered as a Nordic, Pacific, Pontic, or Baltic country. 
One can assume that in such a vast and diverse country as Russia, the 
geopolitical vision of the world will differ from district to district. For in-
stance, the attitudes to foreign countries prevalent in Kaliningrad will differ 
from those in Moscow or the Far East. In particular, they are affected by per-
sonal experience of foreign travel. The available data suggest that such dif-
ferences do indeed exist; however, they are rather insignificant, for instance, 
in comparison to those between large cities and the rest of the country [26]. 
Firstly, this work aims to examine how the official Russian political dis-
course affects the geopolitical visions of the Kaliningrad youth. The second 
objective is to compare the mutual images and geopolitical orientations of 
Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian students and compare them with the “objec-
tive” differences between the Kaliningrad region on the one hand and the 
neighbouring Lithuanian and Polish territories on the other. 
 
The political discourse in Russia and the EU as a factor affecting  
the geopolitical vision among the youth populations of Kaliningrad,  
Gdansk, and Klaipeda 
 
A total screening of 2000—2004 and 2008—2012 publications on the 
problem of interactions between Russia and the neighbouring countries in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Newspaper)1 shows that, since the 
                                                     
1 Although having a small circulation, Nezavisimaya Gazeta presents itself as a 
“high quality” daily newspaper meant for an educated audience, experts, and deci-
sion-makers. Having adopted a centrist position and being moderately critical of the 
acting government, the newspaper presents a wide range of opinions. This study 
was conducted by the Laboratory for Geopolitical Studies of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences within the EUBORDERSCAPES project supported by the Seventh 
Framework Programme. 
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first post-Soviet years, there have been two main plotlines in the national 
discourse on Kaliningrad as a Russian exclave separated from the mainland 
by Belarus and Lithuania. One of them is the persistence of a high militarisa-
tion level and the region’s transformation in “Russia’s westernmost outpost” 
facing a potential enemy — NATO. In the 1990s, the circumstances required 
for a massive reduction in the number of military units and personnel sta-
tioned in the region, as well as the abandonment of many high-cost facilities 
— airfields, storage facilities, garrisons, etc. Since the late 1990s, the re-
gion’s abrupt demilitarisation was juxtaposed to NATO’s eastward expan-
sion and development of military infrastructure2. 
Another alternative is the orientation to extracting maximum benefit for 
both Russia and the region from the latter’s new geographical position. This 
includes economic and political openness, and the transformation of the re-
gion into a “test site” for cooperation with European countries aimed at re-
moving barriers to transboundary exchange and developing cross-border 
contacts, creating a favourable climate for foreign investment, and develop-
ment of foreign trade and logistics. This scenario created an opportunity to 
improve the welfare of regional population to the level of the neighbouring 
EU countries. At the same time, there emerged a risk of a weaker connection 
to mainland Russia, the rise of externally supported separatist movements 
aimed at the establishment of a fourth independent Baltic state, and a threat 
to national security3. 
It became obvious that the optimal way was to attain a balance between 
the region’s openness and keeping it as part of the Russian Federation. 
Moreover, in the current conditions, the one is not possible without the other 
[18; 19]. The Concept for the Federal Socioeconomic Policy towards the Ka-
liningrad region (2001) stresses that the key objective of safeguarding na-
tional interests and security in the Kaliningrad region is ensuring an interna-
tional economic, political, and military strategic position of the territory that 
will eliminate the threat of the weakening of the region’s role and signifi-
cance as an integral part of the Russian Federation. These conditions include 
a sustainable socioeconomic development of the region, and improvement of 
standards of living to a level comparable to that of the neighbouring EU 
countries, which would be impossible without participating in the economic 
regionalisation processes in the Baltic. The experience of first post-Soviet 
years suggests that the region’s exclave position incurs extra costs for the 
                                                     
2 See, for instance, [1 – 3; 7; 8; 20]. 
3 See, for instance [4; 5].  
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economy and population, which have to be compensated for either from the 
federal budget or through creating special, preferential conditions for the in-
clusion of the region into the international division of labour [18]. 
This brings us to the second plotline of the Kaliningrad discourse gener-
ated by an objective contradiction between the need to take into account the 
unique position of Kaliningrad (the more so after Lithuania’s and Poland’s 
accession to the EU and NATO) and the development of a common legal 
framework for the whole territory of Russia and the EU. 
On the one hand, Kaliningrad strived to ensure federal subsidies and 
privileges to compensate for the high cost of transit and higher prices for gas 
and power. In the 1990s, opinions were voiced that the region should not on-
ly be transformed into a special economic zone enjoying customs and tax 
concessions but also become autonomous up to obtaining a “status of a 
state” and partially or completely integrating into the EU. These ideas were 
not abandoned in the 2000s. Moreover, the proximity to the EU border 
opened new opportunities for Kaliningrad residents in the post-Soviet period 
and not only as a source of income from the gradually declining cross-border 
trade. A “demonstration effect” emerged — residents of Russian border dis-
tricts got interested in the European consumption standards and social life 
organisation, which results in certain expectations from the regional and fed-
eral authorities as to economic and social measures based on an adequate 
understanding of the exclave’s unique position4. 
On the other hand, the country’s leadership — especially in the early 
2000s after V. Putin had been elected president — strived to strengthen the 
unity of the national legal and economic space and abandon the practice of 
contractual relations between the federal centre and regions based on differ-
ent conditions. Radical mottoes voiced by some social activists in Kalinin-
grad raised in the Kremlin legitimate concerns over separatist trends and did 
not contribute to a favourable attitude to the demands for a special regime 
and discourse on the region as a “laboratory of cooperation” with the Euro-
pean Union. Moreover, the 1990s also saw discussions on “returning” Ka-
liningrad to Germany and populating it with Russian Germans, as well as 
territorial claims of Lithuania. It is worth noting that the fear of losing Rus-
sian sovereignty over the exclave and a revision of the whole system of post-
war borders can be clearly traced in the Russian discourse until today. 
In the course of negotiations on the visa regime and, later, transit be-
tween mainland Russia and Kaliningrad, the European Union also neglected 
                                                     
4 For examples of such discourse see [6; 17] 
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Russian arguments about the unique position of the region and concluded 
corresponding agreements. The leaders of the European Commission and in-
dividual countries stressed the inviolability and universality of the rules es-
tablished by the Schengen Agreement and voiced unwavering support for the 
national sovereignty of Poland and Lithuania, which excluded any possibil-
ity of accepting Russian transit proposals. 
The EU wanted to eliminate the possibility of the region turning into 
a constant source of “soft risks”, i.e. cross-border crime, illegal immigra-
tion, drug abuse, infectious diseases, etc. Security — as understood by 
the EU — required stricter control over transit to and from the Kalinin-
grad region and did contradict the interests of Russia, which counted on a 
simplified procedure of transit between the region and the mainland. 
Brussels’s policy towards the Kaliningrad region was affected by con-
cerns over disparities in social conditions between the Russian exclave 
and the surrounding EU territories, which accounted for a high level of 
social pathologies. This was the focus of Western European mass media 
when covering the Kaliningrad issue. 
No matter what difficulties and contradictions plagued the development 
of the Kaliningrad situation, it is obvious that it has changed for the better in 
the new century in comparison to the 1990s, which also holds true for main-
land Russia. The relative transparency of border gave the neighbours a good 
opportunity to develop a new vision on the prospects of the Russian exclave 
and to rediscover it. 
 
The challenges of neighbourhood: reality, images of each other  
and individual strategies 
 
To answer the question as to what degree these opportunities were 
grasped, at the end of 2012, we surveyed students of the Immanuel Kant Bal-
tic Federal University (Kaliningrad), and the Universities of Gdansk and 
Klaipeda5. Almost 675 senior students in humanities were surveyed using 
similar questionnaires, including 252 in Kaliningrad, 217 in Gdansk, and 206 
                                                     
5 We would like to express our sincere gratitude for their contribution to the study to 
Prof G.M. Fedorov, Associate Prof E.S. Fidrya (IKBFU), Profs T. Palmowski and J. 
Wendt (University of Gdansk), as well as Dr E. Spiriajevas (Klaipeda University). 
Of course, the views of students differ from the general opinion. They constitute the 
most educated part of the young generation, which socialised after the collapse of 
the socialist system and the disintegration of the USSR, thus studying their opinions 
is of great research interest.   
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in Klaipeda. Alongside typical sociodemographic questions, the question-
naire contained three sections. The first one comprised questions about the 
personal experience of foreign travel including visits to the neighbouring 
countries (Poland and Lithuania for students from Kaliningrad, the Kalinin-
grad region and Lithuania for those from Gdansk, etc.), command of foreign 
languages, identity, and associations with the word “Kaliningrad.” The sec-
ond section contained questions about the financial situation of the respon-
dents’ families, the socioeconomic situation in the region and the neighbour-
ing countries, their prospects, and intentions to migrate. The third section 
brought together questions aimed at identifying the geopolitical image of the 
world as seen by students: their assessment of the attractiveness of different 
countries of the world and priorities of economic ties with different countries 
and regions. For the purpose of an international and interregional compari-
son, we tried to use questions from the earlier surveys by the leading Russian 
polling organisations as much as possible. Of special interest is the compari-
son with the results of the international research project “Visions of Europe 
in the World” supported by the Seventh Framework programme. The project 
included a survey of 9,300 students from across 18 countries, which used a 
similar questionnaire. 
We also compared the socioeconomic performance of the towns and 
districts of the Kaliningrad region, powiats of the Pomeranian and War-
mian-Masurian voivodeships of Poland, and the Klaipeda, Tauragė, and 
Marijampolė counties of Lithuania. However, it was complicated by the 
incomparability of the region’s results before and after the 2008 adminis-
trative reform, which had redrawn the borders and changed the composi-
tion of municipalities. It was shown that the situation in these regions is 
comparable. For instance, an average net salary in the Kaliningrad region 
(PPP) is 716 USD, in the Pomeranian voivodeships 805 USD, in the 
Klaipeda County 762 USD. The food basket cost is 20—23 % lower in 
Gdansk than in Kaliningrad or Klaipeda; however, Gdansk residents have 
to pay twice as much as Kaliningraders for petrol, utilities, and public 
transportation. It is cheaper to buy a flat in Kaliningrad, and a car in 
Gdansk or Klaipeda. On average, the Polish are a little bit ‘richer’ than 
Russians and Lithuanians, but the Lithuanian regional community is less 
segregated by income than the Polish or Russian ones. Despite a heavy 
dependence on imported components and the condition of the Russian 
consumer market, industrial production has significantly grown in Kalin-
ingrad in the 2000s. Its level per capita exceeds that of the Warmian-
Masurian voivodeships and is almost as high as in one of the most devel-
V. Kolosov, O. Vendina  
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oped Polish regions — the Pomeranian Voivodeships. The demographic 
situation in the Russian exclave is rather favourable in comparison to the 
neighbouring Polish and the more so Lithuanian regions, where the natu-
ral decrease is coupled with a massive migration outflow. Due to a posi-
tive net migration rate, the population size stabilised as early as the 
1990s; however, the Kaliningrad region has a lower life expectancy and 
the mortality structure reflects a high level of alcoholism and other social 
pathologies [14]. 
Nevertheless, Kaliningrad students have a more pessimistic opinion 
of the condition and prospects of their region than their peers from 
Gdansk and Klaipeda. In the latter cities, 45—48 % of the respondents 
viewed the situation in their region as favourable or rather favourable. 
24 % and 31 % respectively consider it similar to the other regions of 
their countries, and only 29 % in Gdansk and 15 % in Klaipeda see it as 
complicated or very complicated. 
Moreover, young Kaliningraders do not believe in any good prospects 
for their region. Approximately 56 % of the respondents are convinced that 
the region’s economic situation will not change or is likely to or will defi-
nitely deteriorate in the near future. This scepticism is rather surprising in 
view of that the respondents are young people in their early 20s. Moreover, 
they claim to be aware of the region’s prospects. The percentage of students 
who answered this question at IKBFU was higher than at the universities of 
Gdansk and Klaipeda. Russians are used to rely only on themselves and do 
not believe that the authorities or any other power can ensure a better life for 
them. It is worth noting that Kaliningrad students are more optimistic of their 
own future than the prospect of the region’s development: 58 % of the re-
spondents expect that the living standards of their families will increase in a 
short-term perspective. 
Unlike Kaliningraders, 48 % of Polish students are optimistic of the fu-
ture of the region and only 23 % think that the situation will not change and 
12 % that it will deteriorate or definitely deteriorate. In Klaipeda, young 
people are more optimistic. Most respondents (66 %) believe that the life in 
their region will definitely or is likely to become better. An absolute majority 
(59 %) are confident of their future. However, Polish students doubt that 
they will ever achieve personal success: there are only 39 % of optimists in 
Gdansk (a third of the respondents gave no answer). 
Despite differences in estimating the development of their regions, the 
young people of the three bordering regions are brought together by similar 
individual life strategies: migration intentions are very strong among them. 
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More than half of the respondents (55 % in Kaliningrad, 58 % in Gdansk, 
and 66 % in Klaipeda) stressed that they would like to move in the next two 
years or after graduation. Therefore, the migration potential of Kaliningrad 
youth is much higher than the Russian average in people aged 18—
24 (39 %). However, the reason behind it remains the same — searching for 
a well-paid interesting job (mentioned by 72 % in Kaliningrad, 86 % in 
Gdansk, and 76 % in Klaipeda). In the conditions of a limited or shrinking 
market, it is difficult to find a job that will meet the expectations and be ade-
quate to the self-esteem; they do not see such opportunities in their home 
city. Only 10 % of Kaliningraders who are willing to move simply want to 
change the district of residence; 11 % want to live in large cities, mostly 
Moscow, which is associated with life success in Russia. Most students of all 
three universities opt for emigration. In Kaliningrad, such students account 
for two thirds. Young Kaliningraders are better acquainted with the life 
abroad than their peers in other Russian regions: 83 % of them have been 
abroad, most of them more than once. Moreover, out of 830 surveyed in 
Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Khabarovsk, and Stavropol two years earlier within 
the above-mentioned project, only 44 % had been abroad [11]. 
Whereas Klaipeda students still dream of an interesting and well-paid 
job abroad (58 % of those willing to move), the Polish respondents are less 
susceptible to such illusions. “Only” 34 % of students opt for emigration. 
Poles have a vast experience of mass labour migration — by different esti-
mates, from 1.2 to 3 million people have left the country over the last dec-
ade. They are well acquainted with the problems of adaptation and dissatis-
faction with the job that does not require their level of qualification. Twice 
as much Polish students as Russian and Lithuanian ones while opting for 
migration would prefer to stay in their country. 
Despite the differences in the objective conditions and assessments of 
personal prospects, the willingness of the youth to leave their countries is in-
dicative of the perception of their regions as a periphery. The answers to 
questions about the attractiveness of different countries give an idea of the 
common and different features of their geopolitical vision of the world and 
the image of neighbours. 
 
The world as seen by students  
from Kaliningrad, Gdansk, and Klaipeda 
 
As the results of the project “Visions of Europe in the World” suggest, 
the mental map of young people is dominated by unshaken Eurocentrism. 
V. Kolosov, O. Vendina  
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They believe that the best place to live in are the large countries of West-
ern Europe — France, Italy, Germany — as well as Spain, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Switzerland, and other small European states. In comparison to the 
population, Russians showed maximum Europhilia. Positive attitudes to 
“old” Europe have been stressed by many authors [15]. The Russian re-
spondents associate European countries with recreation, entertainment, 
shopping, and luxury goods and services. Tourism and consumption ac-
count for eight out of twenty most common associations. The vision of Eu-
rope by Russians is more consumption-focused than that of their inter-
national peers. However, an important factor is the rich historical and cul-
tural heritage Russians learn about at an early age from school textbooks 
and TV shows. Thus, Europe is associated with the notions of “civilisa-
tion”, “history”, and “education”. Some of Russian students are attracted to 
Western European countries because of the values of democracy, constitu-
tional state, a developed education system, and achievements in research 
and technology. However, such associations as “freedom” and “democ-
racy” are less common in Russia [12; 23]. 
On the contrary, the “not to live in” list is topped by Iraq, Iran, Af-
ghanistan, and Pakistan that are associated with Islamic fundamentalism 
and military conflicts, as well as it contains most countries of Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America. The reasons behind are cultural distance, the 
received opinion about low standards of living in these countries, and au-
thoritarian regimes in some of them. As a rule, Russia and the other for-
mer Soviet countries (except the Baltics) have a strongly negative image. 
Here, personal experience does not always affect a country’s attractive-
ness. The image of familiar neighbouring countries is unfavourable if 
they are perceived as poorer or associated with conflicts of the past. For-
mer Soviet republics are not attractive for the Russian respondents, since 
the living standards there are lower than in Russia; they are not associ-
ated with recreation, consumption, or exotic experience. The unattrac-
tiveness of some countries, for instance, Ukraine or Georgia, for Russian 
is apparently explained by their negative image promoted by the major 
TV channels. 
Students from Kaliningrad, Gdansk, and Klaipeda were asked to name 
five countries where they would and where they would not like to live in the 
near future. Then, an “asymmetry index” — the difference between the 
number of positive and negative mentions divided by the total number there-
of — was calculated. 
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Table 1 
 
“Asymmetry indices” calculated on the basis of the respondents’  
answers about five countries they would and would not like to live in 
 
Region Kaliningrad Gdansk Klaipeda 
Russia -0.13 -0.95 -0.81 
Poland 0.23 - -0.90 
Lithuania -0.39 -0.93 - 
Latvia, Estonia -0.68 -0.90 -0.81 
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova  -0.72 -0.98 -0.88 
Germany 0.79 0.16 0.95 
UK and Ireland 0.85 0.57 0.47 
France, Italy, Spain,  
Benelux countries 0.68 0.50 0.62 
Nordic countries 0.75 0.70 0.83 
Central European countries  0.96 0.20 0.58 
Balkan countries -0.08 -0.39 -0.62 
Turkey and Middle East -0.94 -0.80 -0.75 
USA and Canada 0.35 0.57 0.75 
China -0.74 -0.84 -0.88 
Countries of Southeast Asia and 
Far East 0.10 -0.13 -0.11 
Australia and New Zealand 0.30 1.00 - 
Latin America  -0.25 -0.39 - 
Countries of South Caucasus 
and Central Asia -0.17 -1.00 -1.00 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Africa -1.00 -1.00 - 
India and Pakistan -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
 
As table 1 shows, students of the Baltic region, which lies in close prox-
imity to “old” Europe, are not an exception from the general pattern. Their 
European orientation is evident. The highest positive indices on the mental 
maps of students from all three universities are characteristic of the Nordic 
countries (0.75 in Kaliningrad, 0.70 in Gdansk, and 0.83 in Klaipeda), “Lat-
in” countries of Western Europe (France, Italy, and Spain), and the Benelux 
countries. However, there are some slight differences. For example, the UK 
and Ireland are very attractive for Kaliningraders (0.85), whereas Poles and 
Lithuanians have a more ambivalent attitude to these countries of traditional 
Polish and Lithuanian immigration (0.57 and 0.47 respectively). Neighbour-
V. Kolosov, O. Vendina  
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ing Germany, which is so attractive for Kaliningrad students (0.79) and 
Klaipeda (0.95), is perceived differently by residents of Gdansk — the city 
where World War II commenced (0.16). 
Many students consider the leading countries of the New World — the 
USA and Canada — a possible place of residence. In Poland and especially 
Lithuania, the attitude to the USA is very positive (0.57 and 0.75 respec-
tively). Historically, the USA has occupied a unique place in the geography 
of Lithuanian emigration. Among young Kaliningraders, as well as Russians 
in general, the attitude to the USA is more ambivalent. They value high liv-
ing standards and US achievements in research and technology; however, 
many respondents perceive this country as a superpower that dominates 
NATO, strives for world hegemony, is deeply involved in international con-
flicts, and imposes its interests on other states. That is how the role of the 
USA is presented by federal TV channels. 
Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, African countries, India and Pakistan, and Cen-
tral Asia have the most repellent image according to both the survey respon-
dents and the results of the project “Visions of Europe in the World.” No one 
wanted to live in these countries. A negative image is also characteristic of 
the countries of the Middle East, Latin America, and China (in the latter 
case, due to cultural differences). However, in all three cities including Klai-
peda, neighbouring Latvia and Estonia are perceived as unattractive (-0.68 in 
Kaliningrad, -0.90 in Gdansk, and -0.81 in Klaipeda). 
Within the “Gdansk-Kaliningrad-Klaipeda” triangle, the neighbours have 
a negative attitude towards each other in most cases. An exception is the 
largely positive image of Poland in Kaliningrad (0.23). Lithuania is not at-
tractive for Russian and especially Lithuanian students (-0.39 and -0.93 re-
spectively), Russia and Poland for Lithuanian ones (-0.81 and -0.90). One 
can assume that the negative image of Lithuania in Gdansk and of Poland in 
Klaipeda is a product of a common historical past. As one could expect, 
Russia has a strongly negative image in Gdansk (-0.95). The negative conno-
tation of Russia emphasises the otherness of Poland, its contemporaneity, 
and love of freedom. The other post-Soviet European neighbours — 
Ukraine. Belarus, and Moldova — are also unpopular in the three cities. It is 
evident that such geopolitical vision of the world does not contribute to re-
gional cooperation. 
The image of Baltic neighbours is developed by not only TV and other 
media, the education system and the political culture inherited by the young-
er generation, but also by personal experience of visits to the adjacent cities. 
Transboundary flows of young people are sharply asymmetrical. 27 % of 
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Kaliningrad students have never been in Poland, 56 % have visited the coun-
try at least once, and 22 % travel there every year or even several times a 
year. Although Lithuania is less attractive for Kaliningrad students than Po-
land, 63 % of the respondents have visited this country. However, 88 % of 
the Gdansk and 68 % of the Klaipeda respondents have never crossed the 
Russian border. 9 % of the Poland and 24 % of Lithuanian respondents have 
been there at least once. Almost all of them visited Kaliningrad rather than 
mainland cities6. The answers given by the respondents to the questions 
about the purpose of travel and border regime give an idea of the reasons be-
hind these substantial differences. 
Apparently, the reason is not the visa regime, although it does affect the 
frequency of contacts. Polish and Lithuanian students go to Kaliningrad so 
rarely that it was impossible to obtain their opinion about the efficiency of 
the border regime. As to Kaliningraders, only 14 % are content with the re-
gime of the Russian-Polish border, whereas 31.7 % are of the opposite opin-
ion7 (the same percent of respondents gave no answer). However, only 8 % 
mentioned difficulties with obtaining a visa. The main reasons of discontent 
are time losses at the border control and the insufficient number of check-
points. Similar answers were given to the questions about the Russian-
Lithuanian border. 
The command of a foreign language is not an obstacle to exchange. From 
77 % of the respondents in Kaliningrad to 88 % in Klaipeda, and 92 % in 
Gdansk said that they spoke a foreign language, in most cases, English. More-
over, in Klaipeda — one of the most “Russian” and, similar to Kaliningrad, 
migrant-welcoming cities of Lithuania, 57 % of students speak Russian. 
Unlike “adult” Kaliningraders, students go to Poland for tourist and en-
tertainment purposes (55 %) rather than shopping (40 %). The other pur-
                                                     
6 Technically, the number of Polish citizens that entered the Kaliningrad region in 
2013 is 56% larger than that of Russians that entered Poland; as to Lithuania, the 
gap is 20%. However, “tank up trips” account for most border crossings by Poles. 
They tank their cars with cheap Russian petrol and resell it in their country. In fact, 
the transboundary flow is very asymmetrical.  
7 The survey was conducted shortly before the introduction of local border traffic 
between the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring Polish voivodeships. How-
ever, it does not mean the total elimination of bureaucratic barriers. Until July 2013, 
those applying for a Polish visa had to prove that they had paid for at least seven 
(later, three) nights at a Polish hotel. Simultaneously, a new requirement was intro-
duced – to present bills proving that a resident of the Kaliningrad region had used 
the services of Polish hotels during the last two years. 
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poses (education, workshops and conferences, professional meetings, visit-
ing relatives and friends) are mentioned much more rarely. The motive be-
hind visits to Lithuania are rather similar, with the major one being tourism 
and entertainment (39 %). Shopping in Lithuania is less popular than in Po-
land (16 %). Young Poles and Lithuanians visit the Kaliningrad region for 
tourism and entertainment and, to a lesser degree, shopping. Therefore, of 
importance is the symbolic capital of Kaliningrad, its brands and image. 
 
The images of the “them,” preferred partners, and identity 
 
Despite limited familiarity with the Kaliningrad region and a number of 
objective indicators, most Polish and Lithuanian students believe that the 
economic situation in the region is much worse than in their countries (50 % 
and 36 % respectively). Approximately a third of Polish and Lithuanian re-
spondents honestly said that they could not give a definite answer to this 
question. 
The little interest in Kaliningrad shown by the Polish and Lithuanian re-
spondents is based on its negative image. Clichés relating to the image of 
Russia in general rather than Kaliningrad are rather widespread, namely vod-
ka, alcoholism, AIDS, Stalin, Putin, cold, lack of freedom, communism, 
USSR, mafia, labour camps (mentioned by 11 % of students8). Following the 
1990s “tradition,” many associate the city with poverty, underdevelopment, 
low standards of living, a forsaken region, shadow economy, smuggling, 
war, and a Russian outpost (17 %). However, neutral associations prevail: a 
Russian region, a region on the map (37 %); a neighbour of Poland, East of 
Europe, border, transit, border crossing difficulties (7 %); cheap groceries, 
cheap petrol, port, Russian, excursions to Gdansk shops, Russian nouveau 
riche, social economic zone, a Russian exclave (24 %). These associations 
reflect the vagueness of the image of Kaliningrad. Just a few respondents 
remembered such components of the city brand as Kant, amber, the Amber 
Room, the Amber Road. 6 % of the Gdansk respondents had no associations 
with the word “Kaliningrad”. 
It produced no reaction in an even greater number of Klaipeda students 
(21 %). For 30 % of the Lithuanian respondents, it is simply a Russian city, 
part of Russia or even an unfamiliar city. Most students (61 %) have nega-
tive associations with Kaliningrad. Their spectrum is rather broad: political 
instability, absence of freedom, corruption, unwillingness to live and go 
                                                     
8 The percentage does not total 100 due to multiple responses. 
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there, dangerous place, high crime rate, lawlessness, bandits, cheap drugs, 
shadow economy, smuggling, cigarettes, underdeveloped infrastructure, 
poverty, low standards of living, a plundered city, poor marketplace, 
cheaper goods, petrol, social problems, unfriendly people, a city unattrac-
tive for tourists, a threat: NPP, military base, army, Soviet city, Soviet 
rules; border areas, transit territory, visa complications, time lost at the 
border; closed city, isolated city, exclave, periphery, economically back-
ward city. The respondents that had more or less positive associations 
(a historical city, Königsberg, water park, zoo, attractive big city, oppor-
tunities, commercial city, a different city, much money…; good people, rel-
atives, friends; amber, the Curonian Spit) accounted for only 14 %. Just a 
few respondents identified Kaliningrad as a neighbouring city and linked it 
with the idea of cooperation. 
Probably the most surprising finding is the weakness of the image of Ka-
liningrad among its young residents. 43 % could not define their attitude to 
it. The romantic and nostalgic associations (home town, the city where I live, 
my favourite city, the best city), other positive associations (an old, histori-
cal, clean, beautiful city, architecture, cobblestone roads, sightseeing) or a 
poor set of traditional brands (amber, the Curonian Spit, the Baltic Sea) ac-
counted for 30 %. However, there were only a few strongly negative associa-
tions (a neglected, inharmonious city, public thoroughfare, pity for the re-
gion, poverty, enclave, outskirts). A certain regional identity can be seen in 
rare (14 %) associations with a European city, proximity to Europe, the West 
of Russia, not-that-much-of-Russia and associations relating to the German 
past: a German city, Königsberg, former East Prussia, Germany. 
Therefore, as to symbols, Russian students have nothing to offer to the 
neighbours “in exchange.” They are not interested in cooperation with the 
neighbours, whereas the neighbours are psychologically “repelled” by Rus-
sia as a partner. For all countries bordering on Russia, the latter is an impor-
tant “friend” which makes it possible to legitimise the actions of local elites 
in front of the population. It shapes the rhetoric of political discourses rang-
ing from sharply critical to moderate ones following the ideas of “national 
pragmatism”. Sometimes Russia seems to be a partner the relations with 
which are complicated but equal. Sometimes it seems to be a politically un-
stable country striving for domination in the region and using extralegal eco-
nomic, migratory, cultural, and military and strategic mechanisms for pres-
surising its neighbours. People are constantly reminded that Russia is a po-
tential overseas threat. Negative attitude to the Russian Federation is rein-
forced by an intensive stream on the post-Soviet states that are considered 
V. Kolosov, O. Vendina  
 
 19
“natural allies” in the confrontation with Russia. This symbolic policy dis-
seminated through mass media significantly affects the emerging worldview 
of young people and holds regional development hostage to geopolitics. 
It is not a coincidence that Russia is at the bottom of the list of promising 
economic and political partners as seen by Polish and Lithuanian students. 
They view the EU and, first of all Germany, as the chief partner. The eco-
nomic and political interactions with Germany are considered the most im-
portant by 67 % of Polish students. On this list, Germany is followed by 
France, the UK, Italy, and the “small” countries of Western Europe, and the 
Nordic countries. Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania were mentioned only by 
several respondents. However, the USA was named as a promising partner 
by just a slightly greater number of respondents. Belarus was hardly men-
tioned at all. Therefore, eastern neighbours do not exist for Gdansk students 
as partners, which is another proof of the unwavering orientation to Europe, 
which is identified with the EU. 
Klaipeda students consider the Nordic countries (58 % of the respon-
dents), Germany (52 %), France, Italy, and Spain (50 %) the most promising 
economic and political partners for Lithuania. However, they do not regard 
poorer EU neighbours as such. Unlike their Gdansk peers, the Klaipeda re-
spondents understand the importance of economic ties with Russia, which 
accounts for most cargoes processed at the local port. It was called a promis-
ing counteragent by as many students as considered the countries of “old” 
Europe as such (53 %). The distant USA was mentioned as an important 
partner half as often (25 %). Neighbouring Belarus and Ukraine were hardly 
mentioned at all. 
Kaliningraders, as well as their neighbours, are mostly oriented towards 
Europe/the EU. However, their vision of partners is more diversified. The 
list of promising economic and political partners is topped by Germany 
(47 %) followed by neighbouring Poland (34 %), Japan (25 %), and China 
(22 %). The “ranking” of Lithuania and the neighbouring Baltics is very low. 
It raises concerns that most of the respondents (70 %) see the future of the 
region in cooperation with the EU rather than the other Russian territories 
(only 11 %). This is the key difference between the geopolitical vision of 
young Kaliningrad residents and the official discourse. 
The idea of the European vector as a guarantee of success rooted in the 
minds of the youth from all three regions contributes to disintegration proc-
esses rather than potential integration, since students have a largely negative 
image of each other. They do not consider cooperation with the immediate 
neighbours as promising (an exception is the attitude of Kaliningraders to 
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cooperation with Poland). In the case of Kaliningrad, such attitudes can re-
sult in the isolation from mainland Russia. The border between the Baltic EU 
state and Russia is interpreted by students from all three universities as a wa-
tershed between two worlds, one of which is ruled by “order” and the other 
by “chaos.” Moreover, representatives of the “world of chaos” clearly dem-
onstrate their willingness to enter the “world of order”, which contributes to 
the barrier function of the border and impedes the openness necessary for 
modern development. 
Moreover, both Lithuanian and Polish student consider the accession to 
the EU and the Schengen areas as a privilege that should not be extended to 
Russians. At the University of Gdansk, only 18 % of students deem a visa-
free regime with Russia possible, 18 % only that for the residents of border 
districts. Approximately a third believes that this problem can be solved only 
in a long-term perspective, whereas 7 % are convinced that such regime 
should not be introduced. Klaipeda residents are more liberal: a third of them 
support the idea of a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia; 19 % 
would grant it only to the residents of border districts; 17 % believe that the 
visa regime should be preserved in the near future (30 % did not give a defi-
nite answer). It is not surprising in view of that young people see the Kalin-
ingrad region and Russia in general as a source of possible threats despite the 
evident benefits derived from the travel of Russian neighbours. The youth 
interpret the border as a physical phenomenon rather than an institute that 
was created by people and requires modernisation. 
However, more than half of young Kaliningraders supportive of inten-
sive exchange with the EU approve of the idea of a visa-free regime; another 
fourth believes that a visa-free regime is possible only for the residents of 
border districts. 
Kaliningrad students differ from their peers from Gdansk and Klaipeda 
in that they identify themselves with their country to a lesser degree — 22 % 
as compared to 30 % and 49 % respectively (table 2). For example, a 
2011 national survey showed that 72 % of the respondents felt a strong con-
nection to Russian citizens; moreover, this identity was the strongest. In 
comparison to 2004, the self-identification of Russians with their civic na-
tion has increased more than twofold [9]. However, the sample included the 
whole population, whereas our survey examined only students. However, a 
manifold difference in results makes it possible to assume that young Kali-
ningraders are different from their peers in their feeling of affiliation with 
the Russian civic nation. According to the results of the Russian survey con-
ducted within the project “Visions of Europe in the World,” Russian students 
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had the most pronounced national identity in all 18 countries: 62 % of them 
said that, first of all, they felt themselves citizens of their country. 
Slightly over half of all Polish students and slightly less than half of Rus-
sian ones associate themselves primarily with their city, district, or region. 
Moreover, the regional identity (as shown above, not a transboundary one) is 
stronger in Kaliningraders than the residents of Gdansk and Klaipeda. Thus, 
it is possible to speak of a logical but rather complicated process of the for-
mation of a certain regional identity, which was triggered by the region’s 
transformation into an exclave. Apparently, in the region, whose population 
changed completely just 65 years ago and, for a long time, consisted of re-
cent migrants from different districts of Russia and from across the Soviet 
Union, this process must be lengthy and complicated. The younger the age 
group, the greater is the share of those born in the region. However, almost a 
third of young Kaliningraders (much more than their peers in Gdansk and 
Klaipeda) define themselves as either people of a certain nationality or do 
not have a clear identity being unwilling or perplexed about associating 
themselves with their country, region, or city (“a world citizen”, “a Euro-
pean”, “a student”, etc.). The analysis of secondary self-identification does 
not change these conclusions. 
 
Table 2 
 
Distribution of answers to the questions about primary 
 self-identification  
 
Region Kaliningrad Gdansk Klaipeda 
Resident of a city/village/district  28.2 46.1 29.1 
Resident of a region  17.9 5.5 3.4 
Citizen of a country 22.2 30.0 49.0 
The end of the table 2  
 
Region Kaliningrad Gdansk Klaipeda 
Person of a certain nationality  8.7 6.0 4.9 
World citizen, a European,  
student, etc. 18.3 8.7 11.6 
No answer 4.8 3.7 2.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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The relative weakness of national identity is in line with the pessimistic 
view on the region’s prospects, emigration intentions, and the belief in the 
cardinal importance of economic ties with the EU rather than other Russian 
regions and the vagueness of the Kaliningrad symbolic capital. A lack of 
confidence in the possibility of self-fulfilment in the region, a small area of 
the Russian island in “big Europe — the EU”, which does not include Russia 
by default, a long-term denial of the Prussian-German period, a lack of sig-
nificant symbols and events associated with the Soviet era, and relative iso-
lation from mainland Russia — all these result in the complications and con-
tradictions in the formation of a regional identity in young people. Its 
uniqueness lies in a combination of heterogeneous elements: Soviet legacy, 
German past (which is mostly a matter of appearance), cultures of different 
Soviet regions — homelands of the parents’ generation, and experience of 
living in modern Russia. 18 % of the respondents have never been to other 
Russian regions. Most of the others have been only to Moscow (73 %) and 
Saint Petersburg (57 %). The other regions have been visited by just a few. 
Moreover, short-term excursions account for most of trips to the two Russian 
capitals. One can conclude that the region’s integration with mainland Rus-
sia is becoming not only an economic, but also a sociocultural objective. It is 
indicative that only 17 % of the Kaliningrad students were convinced that 
they would stay in their country after graduation. 
Despite the facts, most Kaliningrad students (57 %) believe that the 
economic situation in the Kaliningrad region is worse or much worse than 
in Lithuania and only 8 % think otherwise (table 3). However, young peo-
ple feel close to Europe and want to think of themselves as Europeans. 
Nevertheless, it turns to be a myth in practice: there is no common symbol-
ic capital with the neighbours or it is very weak; in most cases, Russia is 
perceived negatively. The exclave proves to be as far from Europe as main-
land Russia. 
Table 3 
 
How do you think the economic situation in the Kaliningrad region  
differs from that in Poland and Lithuania?  
 
Economic situation  
in the Kaliningrad  
region 
Gdansk, % Klaipeda, % 
Kaliningrad, % 
Compared 
to Poland 
Compared to 
Lithuania 
Much better 1.8 4.4 0.8 0.8 
Slightly better 4.6 13.1 5.6 7.1 
V. Kolosov, O. Vendina  
 
 23
The same 7.4 9.7 9.5 10.3 
Slightly worse 27.2 25.2 31.0 34.9 
Much worse  23.0 12.1 32.5 22.2 
No answer 33.7 34.5 20.6 13.1 
The Kaliningrad symbol policy is based on both using and developing 
the resources of historical memory and attempts to reinforce the status of a 
Russian territory through monumental propaganda, i.e. constructing church-
es and erecting monuments. The attempts at re-coding the historical heritage 
contribute to the “islander” identify of Kaliningraders and contradict the in-
terests of creating a common interregional and cultural space. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the attitudes of students from the three Baltic cities has 
shown that the symbolic and mental barriers are harder to overcome than po-
litical and economic ones. Deep-rooted stereotypes are reproduced by the 
youth thus deforming their perception of modern reality. The opportunities 
for accelerating the economic development and modernisation through net-
work forms of resource distribution between the border regions of Russia, 
Poland, and Lithuania, which will make it possible to extract accidental or 
‘institutionalised’ rent, are limited by the society’s frustration and the nega-
tive collective experience of older generations. The interest of young resi-
dents of Gdansk and Klaipeda in the Kaliningrad region is rather limited. 
The liberalisation of transboundary travel has not affected the geopolitical 
vision. The aggravation of the political situation in Europe resulting from the 
Ukrainian crisis does not arouse hopes for a change in the near future. Stu-
dents of all three cities show latent dissatisfaction over the employment pro-
spects manifested in the declared intention to emigrate. The priority given by 
young Kaliningraders, as well as their peers from Gdansk and Klaipeda, to 
connection with Europe has little to do with the reality due to the uncertain 
prospects of the whole complex of Russia-EU relations. 
Nevertheless, as the experience of other countries shows, the introduc-
tion of local border traffic between the Kaliningrad region and the neigh-
bouring Polish voivodeships can improve mutual images and contribute to 
the development of cross-border cooperation. Long-term efforts to diversify 
interactions and promote the positive image of Kaliningrad in the neighbour-
ing Polish regions can yield a certain result. Alongside the measure to 
strengthen the region’s economic base, the enhancement of Kaliningrad’s 
symbolic capital is required for a harmonious development of the Ka-
liningrad identity. 
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This study is carried out in the framework of a Russian Scientific Foun-
dation project No. 14-18-03621 “Russian Border Areas: The Challenges of 
Neighbourhood”. 
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